Persistent disagreements and philosophical agnosticism

Abstract

It is acknowledged that persistent disagreements occur in philosophy. These disagreements seem to motivate philosophical agnosticism, that is, the rational suspension of judgment about the subject of the disagreement, or at least a significant reduction of the credibility assigned to the originally held position. In this paper we give an answer to this problem by means of the following strategy. First, we make use of Thomas Kelly's (2016) argument purporting to show that philosophical agnosticism does not follow from any epistemological theory of disagreement. Second, we show that while liberal conciliationism-i.e., one of the theories within the epistemology of disagreements-does not in fact lead to philosophical agnosticism, it generates another related and equally serious problem, which I will call the problem of mistaken methodology. Finally, drawing on considerations by Brian Weatherson (2011), we give one reason to think that liberal conciliationism, unlike other forms of conciliacionism, is self-refuting, thusly giving an answer to the possible problem of mistaken methodology.